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ABSTRACT
The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic,
and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of
America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government
enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law
enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major
flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety
concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions
to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law
enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of
profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed
journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to
the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law
enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations.
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INTRODUCTION
Racial profiling is ineffective in preventing terrorism. Historical accounts of racial
profiling include the internment of Japanese-Americans in WWII, the profiling of AfricanAmericans and Hispanic-Americans in the War on Drugs, and the profiling of Middle EasternAmericans in the War on Terror. These events show racial profiling is not capable of preventing
all the crimes it sets out to stop. The effectiveness of racial profiling is not well-documented, but
evidence of it is present in the research.
Law enforcement officers (LEOs) have had the responsibility of reducing crime and
protecting the American people throughout the course of U.S. history. 1 LEOs needed to increase
their level of surveillance, investigation, and enforcement due to planned and imminent threats
during World War II (WWII), the War on Drugs, and the War on Terror. LEOs have also taken
preventive measures to reduce a perceived threat before its execution. 2 These preventive
measures include information sharing and analysis, threat recognition, terrorist interdiction, and
any other terrorism prevention activity authorized. 3 Profiling is another of the preventive
measures.

1

A LEO, for purposes of this thesis, is any person who creates, interprets, and enforces laws, regulations, and
legislation to maintain public order and safety in the USA through the laws that govern their authority.

2

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120.

3

A terrorist, for purposes of this paper, is any person who is involved in acts dangerous to human life that violate
federal and state law, appear intended to (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., 18 U.S.C. § 2331;
Terrorism Prevention, 6 U.S.C. § 607 (Aug. 3, 2007).

1

LEOs profile when they investigate people solely for being of the same race, following
the same religion, or possessing the same identifiable characteristics as someone who has
committed a serious or deadly crime. 4 Racial profiling has become more acceptable and
justifiable in light of continuous terrorist threats. 5 Advocates of racial profiling believe
minorities commit most criminal activities, including drug offenses and terrorist attacks,
implying race determines conduct. 6 Some may also believe racial profiling is effective for
national security because public statistics show particular crimes are committed disproportionally
by certain members of particular groups. 7
Historically, race is a characteristic of who has committed a crime. 8 However, many
times race is a variable used primarily to predict and prevent crime, which is ineffective. For
example, the internment process of Japanese-Americans included the relocating and
concentrating of people to a collection location based upon race. After, surviving JapaneseAmericans were given restitutions because the government realized the internment was not the

4

Middle Eastern is a nationality not a race. However, in many countries including the U.S. Middle Eastern is used
as a race. For example, the U.S. Census’ definition of the race white is a person having origins in any of the original
peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. Many would not refer to someone Middle Eastern as white,
they would simply say Middle Eastern to describe their race. For the purposes of this paper, Middle Eastern is a
race. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Race, (1997), https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html.

5

Racial profiling, for purposes of this paper, relies on race, ethnicity, or national origin and not behavior or
information to identify an individual as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity. Sophia E. Harris,
Seeking out Terrorists: Will Racial Profiling do?, 36 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 249, 1 (2005).

6

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120.

7

Refer to limitations sections of this thesis, 41-42.

8

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120.

2

way to address the Japanese spy concern. 9 More recently, using race to identify AfricanAmericans and Hispanic-Americans as drug traffickers in the War on Drugs has failed to fully
prevent the problem. Between 2000 and 2014, the number of overdose deaths from prescription
drugs and Opioid pain relievers has tripled, from Benzodiazepines have quadrupled, and from
heroin have quintupled. 10 In the War on Terror, LEOs are using the classification of Middle
Eastern to identify the group who commit most terrorist acts in the U.S. Racial profiling those
who appear to be Middle Eastern is invalid and presents a geographical limitation because there
are 40 countries with cells of Al-Qaeda ranging anywhere from Malaysia to the Philippines to
Latin America. 11 Profiling will also denigrate and intimidate an entire community of those who
may be categorized as Middle Eastern. 12
This thesis begins with an interpretation of the history of racial profiling in WWII, the
War on Drugs, and the War on Terror. A historical overview of the use of racial profiling in U.S.
national security efforts provides insight on the influences in current counterterrorism operations
and references for future decisions. Next, it will discuss laws and U.S. Supreme Court cases
addressing racial profiling. Then, it will discuss the effectiveness of racial profiling through
terrorist diversity and consistency. Finally, recommendations are provided for how to maintain
national security without racial profiling through reforms in training and policies.
9

Kimberlee Candela, Japanese American Internment, SALEM PRESS ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 2016).

10

NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, Overdose Death Rates, (Dec. 2015), https://www.drugabuse.gov/relatedtopics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates.
11

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120.

12

Id.

3

HISTORY OF PROFILING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
The attacks that occurred on 9/11 shocked the American people. That day, they realized
the need for heightened security everywhere, especially at airports, because of a different type of
terrorism the U.S. federal government was unprepared for. Four planes and 19 individuals, later
identified as Middle-Eastern militants of the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda, conducted
terrorist acts that killed more than 3,000 people. 13
Less than two weeks after the terrorist attacks, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge
became the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. On November
22, 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which made the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) an independent, cabinet-level department. 14 As a result, the DHS was
able to coordinate, and unify comprehensive national security strategies to safeguard the country
against terrorism and respond to future attacks.
The DHS’s vital mission is “to secure the nation from the many threats we face.” 15 The
vital mission branches off into homeland security missions. Two missions that combat terrorism
are to (1) prevent terrorism and enhance security and (2) secure and manage our borders. 16 In
addition, they specifically focus on maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise

13

HISTORY, 9/11 Attacks, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks.

14

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, (Sep. 24,
2015), https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security.
15

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, About DHS, (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs.

16

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Our Mission, (Jul. 13, 2015) http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission.

4

itself. 17 The three responsibilities of missions (1) prevent terrorism and enhance security and (2)
secure and manage our borders are cited below:
(1) prevent terrorism and enhance security (a) prevent
terrorist attacks, (b) the unauthorized acquisition, importation,
movement, or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
materials and capabilities within the United States, and (c) reduce
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources,
essential leadership, and major events to terrorist attacks and other
hazards. 18
(2) secure and manage our borders (a) effectively secure
U.S. air, land, and sea points of entry, (b) safeguard and streamline
lawful trade and travel, and (c) disrupt and dismantle transnational
criminal and terrorist organizations. 19
The ways DHS fulfills the missions are through the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), improving screening for passengers, preventing terrorist travel, and
enhancing the screening process for cargo and baggage. 20 The DHS implemented these measures
to reduce the immediate threat of more attacks and largely relied on the use of racial and
religious profiles of the 9/11 terrorists.
On one end of the spectrum, some Americans believe that although these methods may
violate civil liberties, they are justified because of national security concerns and public safety. 21

17

Id.

18

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, (Jul. 20, 2015),
http://www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security.

19

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Secure and Manage our Borders, (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.dhs.gov/secure-and-manage-borders.

20

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Preventing Terrorism Results, (Jul. 21, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results.

21

Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give into Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 23, 2001), at A1 (noting that a
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll taken a few days following the September 11 attacks revealed that 58% supported
targeting passengers of Middle Eastern descent); Henry Weinstein et al., Racial Profiling Gains Support as Search

5

On the other end of the spectrum, some Americans believe these programs further invade
privacy, mask racial profiling, and violate civil liberties. According to a 1999 Gallup Poll, only
19% of respondents favored racial profiling. 22 Twelve days after 9/11, Gallup conducted a
similar poll and 58% of respondents supported racial profiling used to target people of Middle
Eastern descent. 23 Surprisingly, some of the respondents were Americans who, themselves, had
been subjected to racial profiling prior to 9/11. In 2006, Gallup conducted a poll asking this
open-ended question “Are there any security measures currently used in airports that you think
should be stopped because they are not effective in preventing terrorist attacks? [Which
measures do you think should be stopped?]” 24 Only 2% of the participants responded that they
were against racial profiling. 70% of participants responded that no measures should be
stopped. 25 In a more recent poll Gallup conducted in 2010, they surveyed 1,023 individuals
asking “Some people have suggested that airline passengers who fit the profile of terrorists based
on their age, ethnicity, or gender should be subjected to special, more intensive security checks

Tactic, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2001), at A22 (68% of polled respondents favored targeting passengers of Arab
descent).
22

Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Wide-spread, Particularly Among Young Black Men,
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, (Dec. 9, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/3421/racial-profiling-seen-widespreadparticularlyamong-young-black-men.aspx.
23

Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give in to Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 23, 2001), at A1. Henry Weinstein
et al., Racial Profiling Gains Support as Search Tactic, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2001), at A22.

24

GALLUP, Terrorism in the United States, (2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-UnitedStates.aspx?g_source=racial%20profiling&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles%27.
25

Id.

6

before boarding U.S. flights. Do you favor or oppose this practice?” 26 71% of individuals were in
favor of this practice. 27
During WWII with the internment of Japanese-Americans, followed by the War on Drugs
with Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans, and the War on Terror with Middle Easterners
there has been controversy in the way LEOs were given discretion in the treatment of minority
groups. 28 During these times of heightened national security, laws were enacted that impacted
these minority groups and legally supported racial profiling by LEOs, regardless of the
disadvantages to counterterrorism operations.
The U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines on racial profiling that prevented the
use of race in routine domestic investigative procedures. However, it allowed for particular
suspect descriptions incorporating racial characteristics. 29 For example, racial profiling is stating
the possible suspect of a grand theft auto is a black man leaving a suburb area off Interstate 4
because only 2/50 homes in the subdivision are owned by black families. However, it is not
racial profiling to state, based upon an eyewitness account, the suspect is an unfamiliar AfricanAmerican male who was seen driving a vehicle, owned by a neighbor, out of a suburb area off
Interstate 4. The second statement is using race to describe a suspect who has been seen
26
Susan Page, Poll: Most Support Ethnic Profiling in Air Security, USA TODAY, (2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-01-12-poll-terrorism-obama_N.html.
27

Id.

28

Leone, R.C., The Quiet Republic: The Missing Debate about Civil Liberties after 9/11, In R.C. Leone & G. Anrig.
Jr. (Eds.), The War on Our Freedoms: Civil liberties in an Age of Terrorism, NEW YORK: PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1-22
(2003); Reddick, S.R., Point: The Case for Profiling, INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 79, 154-157, (2004);
Reitzel, J., & Piquero, A. R., Does It Exist? Studying Citizens’ Attitudes of Racial Profiling, POLICE QUARTERLY, 9(2),
161-183 (2006).
29

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 6, (Jun. 17, 2003),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf.

7

committing a supposed crime, and not predicting who may commit a crime. Appearance does not
equal the crime.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines state general enforcement
responsibilities should be carried out without any regard to race. Also, stereotyping certain races
as having a greater predisposition to commit crimes should be absolutely prohibited. 30 Some of
the DOJ guidelines are stated as follows:
The guarantee to all persons of equal protection under the
law is one of the most fundamental principles of our democratic
society. Law enforcement officers should not endorse or act upon
stereotypes, attitudes, or beliefs that a person's race, ethnicity, or
national origin increases that person's general propensity to act
unlawfully. 31
Other guidelines do not prohibit the use of racial profiling in combating terrorism. The
following excerpts are from the guidelines set forth by the U.S. Department of Justice:
In investing or preventing threats to national security or
other catastrophic events (including the performance of duties
related to air transportation security), or in enforcing laws
protecting the integrity of the nation’s borders, federal law
enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to
the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Given the incalculably high stakes involved in such
investigations, federal law enforcement officers who are protecting
national security or preventing catastrophic events (as well as
airport security screeners) may consider race, ethnicity, alienage,
and other relevant factors.

30

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 1, 2-3, (Jun. 17,
2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf.
31

Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt, and Amy Farrell, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection
Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf.

8

Because terrorist organizations might aim to engage in
unexpected acts of catastrophic violence in any available part of
the country (indeed, in multiple places simultaneously, if possible),
there can be no expectation that the information must be specific to
a particular locale or event to a particular identified scheme. 32
It is challenging for LEOs to determine the most appropriate boundaries with which to
properly apply the use of race in an investigation or interrogation because these guidelines are so
broad. This type of profiling is allowed as long as it occurs under the exception for national
security and public safety. 33 There is no restriction on how specific the information or imminent
a threat must be before racial profiling can be appropriately used. 34 There only must be a credible
threat and these threats are frequent. 35 This has created an environment conducive to the
unchecked use of racial profiling. There is an ongoing threat of racial identifiers being abusively
used due to the lack of precise language on the limitations of racial profiling. In order to
overcome the challenge, lessons from history should be learned and policies should be revised.
Evidence has been used to support racial profiling, instead of allowing evidence to lead to the
conclusion that racial profiling is an efficient and effective way to provide national security.
World War II
After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. became involved in WWII and the
government began the internment of Japanese-Americans into camps. On February 19, 1942, two

32

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 5, (Jun. 17, 2003),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf.
33

Id. at 1.

34

K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 124.

35

Id. at 125.

9

months after the attack, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 for
the camps. The order was fueled by fear, race prejudice, and a rumor that Japanese-Americans
sabotaged the war effort and assisted in the attacking. 36 It was one of the first public displays of
the U.S. government’s use of racial profiling of a group of people based upon the actions of a
few. More than 110,000 Japanese-Americans were placed in one of 10 relocation centers for the
duration of the war. 37
Most of the Japanese-Americans who were relocated were first generation immigrants
who legally immigrated, but were prohibited from becoming a citizen through naturalization. 38
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, it was not proven to have been carried out by JapaneseAmericans. If the intent of the internment of Japanese-Americans was to prevent them from
assisting the Japanese from attacking, it is questionable that a mass internment of JapaneseAmericans in Hawaii was not done. 39 During WWII, one-third of Hawaii’s population was of
Japanese descent. The government later offered minimal restitutions to the surviving internees
for the ineffective and morally wrong act of racial profiling. 40
In Michelle Malkin’s book, In Defense of Internment: The Case for “Racial Profiling” in
World War II and the War on Terror, she provides information supporting the internment of
36

Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, The Reader’s Companion to American History: Japanese-American Relocation,
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT PUBLISHING COMPANY, (1991), http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/japaneseamerican-relocation.
37

Executive Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).

38

Kimberlee Candela, Japanese American Internment, SALEM PRESS ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 2016).

39

Id.

40

Id.

10

Japanese-Americans. Based upon her information, messages to and from the Japanese were
being intercepted. 41 The messages were about the help the Japanese were receiving in
California. 42 To an extent, the internment may have been justified because of what was and was
not known during WWII. However, internment is still an extreme version of racial profiling.
The Internment of Japanese-Americans is similar to the War on Terror because the 9/11
hijackers were men from the Middle East who were Muslim extremists with connections and
training in the U.S. All people who fit the hijackers’ description in the U.S. were required to
report themselves or be referred for questioning. The initial reaction, to an extent, was
appropriate because the people detained matched the descriptions of those who committed the
attacks. However, the continuous classification well after the attacks is not warranted.
War on Drugs
The War on Drugs began in the 1970s and is still being combated today. President
Richard Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through an executive order
in July 1973 in response to the increasing number of drug activity in the U.S. and globally. 43 The
order established a single unified command to combat “an all-out global war on the drug
menace.” 44 Although in current times it is overshadowed by the War on Terror, the War on

41

Malkin, Michelle, In Defense of Internment : The Case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II and the War on
Terror, REGNERY PUBLISHING (2004).

42

Id.

43

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA History in Depth: 1980-1985, http://www.dea.gov/about/history/19801985.pdf.
44

Id.

11

Drugs, especially in the beginning, was heavily dependent on the pairing of criminal and racial
profiling.
On March 24, 2016, the Cable News Network (CNN) released a 22-year-old interview
that former Nixon domestic policy chief John Ehrlichman gave to Harper’s Magazine writer Dan
Baum. This report shows how profiling was used to support an idea instead on an idea being
supported by evidence showing profiling is necessary. The published article cites what John
Ehrlichman said:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House
after that had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people…
You understand what I'm saying? We knew we couldn't make it
illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the
public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with
heroin. And then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt
those communities ... We could arrest their leaders, raid their
homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night
on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs?
Of course, we did. 45
In general, criminal profiling is the practice of describing a person who has committed a
particular criminal act, thereby equipping law enforcement officers with investigative
mechanisms and information leading to the offender being apprehended. 46 Criminologists use a
variety of classifications known as typologies to capture the basic components of a crime. 47 The
criminal typologies serve multiple purposes. However, they are primarily used to simplify social

45

Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN POLITICS, (Mar. 24,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/.

46

Brown, N.D. and Newman, D.W., Historical Overview and Perceptions of Racial Profiling in an Era of
Homeland Security, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW, Volume 20 Number 3, 362 (2009).

47

McCorkle, R.C. and Miethe, T.D., The Anatomy of Dangerous Persons, Places, and Situations, CRIME PROFILES
SECOND EDITION, 2 (2001).

12

reality by identifying homogenous groups of crime behaviors that are different from other
clusters of crime behaviors. 48 These classifications are used to increase the understanding of
shared features of criminal events and effectiveness of current crime prevention strategies. Crime
typologies are focused on one or several of the following elements: (a) criminal behavior, (b)
offender attributes, (c) victim characteristics, and (d) situational context. 49
The focus of crime typologies should be the criminal behavior, the situation, the victim
characteristics and then the offender attributes. For example, if a LEO were to say “A homicide
was committed on the corner of 5th and 6th avenue. Video footage shows the suspect is a white
male, about 69 inches tall, with a buzz cut, wearing a blue hoodie and black shorts who may
show signs of prior injuries.” The details are clear and provide an unbiased account of what is
going on. Therefore, it is acceptable to provide a racial characteristic of someone who may have
already committed a criminal act. The issue arises when someone who has not been proven to
have committed a criminal act is profiled based upon their racial characteristic to have most
likely committed a crime. It is not acceptable when a LEO states “A white man is the suspect of
a murder” without eyewitness testimony, DNA, video, photographic, or any type of substantial
evidence.
To assist with the efforts in the War on Drugs, Operation Pipeline was born. 50 Operation
Pipeline, created in 1984, monitored highway systems because of the increasing number of drug

48

Id.

49

Id. at 3.

50

Ramierz, D.A, Hoopes, J., & Quinlan, T. L., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11 World, CRIM. L.
REV., 40(3), 1195-1239 (2003).

13

traffickers who established their networks within the U.S. borders. The DEA desired efficient
cooperation between their organization and state and local LEOs. They also provided classes and
materials to teach LEOs the interdiction laws and policies. The training classes focused on (1)
the law, policy, and ethics governing highway stops and drugs and (2) drug trafficking trends and
key characteristic, or indicators, that were shared by drug traffickers. 51
The DEA’s profile incorporated behavior cues, which led local and state law enforcement
to become more aware of certain items in their surroundings. These items included: rental
vehicles, out-of-state license plates, and tinted windows. In addition, the training of state and
local police officers involved teaching them how to identify drug couriers based partly on race.
Criminal profiling and typologies were eventually used to proactively prohibit crimes, which
lead to disproportionate arrests and convictions of minorities. 52 By the end of the 20th century,
law enforcement methods of using race as the single or influencing factor to stop, search, and
question minorities became known as racial profiling. 53 Consequently, racial profiling shows
more Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans are stopped, searched, and arrested during the
War on Drugs, which has not been successful in winning the War on Drugs. 54 Many people were
not aware of this until victims of racial profiling began taking legal actions and filing complaints

51

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA History in Depth: 1980-1985, http://www.dea.gov/about/history/19801985.pdf.
52

Brown, N.D. and Newman, D.W., Historical Overview and Perceptions of Racial Profiling in an Era of
Homeland Security, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW, Volume 20 Number 3, 362 (2009).

53
Warren J. and Raymer, V.M., To Catch a Terrorist: Can Ethnic Profiling Work?, THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY,
165 (Dec. 2010).
54

Coke, T.E., Racial Profiling Post-9/11: Old Story, New Debate. In C. Brown (Ed.), Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and
the Assault of Personal Freedom, NEW YORK: THE NEW PRESS, 91-111 (2003).

14

against law enforcement agencies. As a result, the phrase, “driving while black,” was used to
describe the disproportionate number of African-American drivers operating vehicles compared
to the rate of African-American motorists stopped or searched. 55
Officers rarely kept accurate records of the stops made, which further complicated the
issue. Therefore, when arrests were made and showed, disproportionately, Hispanic-Americans
and African-Americans were arrested, it supported the idea that racial profiling worked. 56 Critics
of racial profiling were at a disadvantage because the data collected showed that the practice was
at least somewhat effective and good policing.
Many LEOs rely on race to decide who to stop and search. However, only a tiny
proportion of people stopped and searched are drug traffickers. 57 Many people in the drug units
of law enforcement claim drug trafficking in the U.S. is dominated by Hispanic-Americans and
African-Americans, but there is no evidence the drug culture in this country is dominated by
Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans. In fact, a great majority of illicit drug users are
white. 58 Racial profiling on the highway produces no discernible benefit to interdict drug crimes.
The War on Drugs has been fought with ambivalence and ambiguity. 59 The idea of reducing drug
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consumption by limiting the supply is failing. 60 Racial profiling in the War on Drugs is
ineffective because it requires searching hopelessly in a continuous stream of cars to eliminate
drug traffickers. 61
War on Terror
The War on Terror has been in effect since the 1920s. However, after the attacks of 9/11,
the U.S. began to focus more on counterterrorism efforts and creating federal agencies
specifically for that purpose, such as the DHS. As with WWII and the War on Drugs, the
demands from society for better and safer neighborhoods brought about the need for law
enforcement to use racial profiling to help with the War on Terror. The phrase “flying while
brown” spins on “driving while black”, is used to represent the disproportional amount of Middle
Easterners flying and walking compared to the number of Middle Easterners stopped, searched
and detained since 9/11. 62
President George W. Bush declared that “…we must be mindful that as we seek to win
the war that we treat Arab-Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve.” 63 Contrary to
this statement, a little over a year after the attacks on 9/11, the government, through The USA
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PATRIOT Act, created a “Special Registration.” 64 The “Special Registration” required
thousands of Middle Eastern men and boys with Visas from Middle Eastern countries to report to
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) for questioning, fingerprinting, and
photographing. If they did not report, they faced prosecution and deportation. 65
Without abandoning its statement on racial profiling, the DOJ created an exception for
counterterrorism efforts. By 2003, the DOJ took a position where their “efforts to defend and
safeguard against threats to the national security or integrity of the Nation’s borders were
distinguishable from racial stereotyping in criminal investigations.” 66 The “Special
Registration,” by DOJ’s standards, is distinguishable. However, it still had a particular effect on
southeastern Michigan.
Southeastern Michigan has the largest concentration of Middle Eastern Americans and
visitors in the country. 67 Approximately 87% of residents were on the Justice Department’s
initial interview list. 68 Those who were contacted by letter received the following notification
from the local U.S. Attorney and were asked to call the office by a given date to set up an
interview appointment:
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Your name was brought to our attention because, among
other things, you came to Michigan on a visa from a
country where there are groups that support, advocate, or
finance international terrorism. We have no reason to believe
that you are, in any way, associated with terrorist activities.
Nevertheless, you may know something that could be helpful
in our efforts. 69
The interview was described as completely voluntary. However, the recipients of the
letter included people who were on visas from governments who were authoritarian and even
considered abusive. Some recipients interpreted this letter as an order versus an option. Others,
due to their immigration status, feared being detained, deported, denied citizenship and dreaded
the unknown consequences for not doing the interview.
In U.S. history, racial profiling has been consistently used to address national security
and public safety issues. However, racial profiling has been an inappropriate and ineffective
means to provide national security and public safety. The internment of Japanese-Americans was
driven by racial prejudice and rumors. The War on Drugs was started to target Black people and
“hippies.” It was unsuccessful in reducing the number of users and the amount of drugs entering
the U.S. The War on Terror began after 9/11 to prevent terrorism. Likewise, the targeting of
Middle Eastern people has limited the success of counterterrorism operations. Reviewing these
three historical events, the use of racial profiling and its success in addressing national security
and public safety concerns are notable. However, there are more effective ways that objectives
could be met. The use of racial profiling as a method to protect the U.S. has preoccupied LEOs
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and inhibited them from developing more reasonable and effective solutions, which is
disadvantageous to the process of attaining national security and public safety.

19

UNITED STATES LAWS AND SUPREME COURT CASES
Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to combat terrorism after 9/11. In 2015, the act
was replaced with the USA Freedom Act. The techniques used by LEOs are legally upheld
through the sections and authorities created in these acts. In addition, United States federal and
state Supreme Court cases have upheld race as a legal factor in certain situations, while others
have not.
USA PATRIOT Act and USA Freedom Act
A commonly known counterterrorism legislation is the USA PATRIOT Act and, most
recently the USA Freedom Act, which amends parts of it. George W. Bush signed the USA
PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, less than two months after 9/11. The USA PATRIOT Act
addressed many topics, including domestic security, protecting the border, and investigating
terrorism. 70
Title I, domestic security, section 102 condemns discrimination against Arab and Muslim
Americans. 71 Title IV, protecting the border, exercises the right to use the entry and exit data
program enacted by section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996. 72 It also authorizes the Attorney General to detain and certify any
alien as a terrorist where there are reasonable grounds to believe he/she is affiliated with
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designated terrorist organizations or engaged in terrorist activities. 73 Title V, investigating
terrorism, authorized LEOs to conduct surveillance and physical searches to investigate against
terrorism. 74 Each title provided ample room for profiling since it is up to LEOs, such as the
Attorney General, to decide if there are reasonable grounds to link someone to a terrorist
organization or action through data and physical searches.
Since the USA PATRIOT Act was written in response to the September 11 attacks, in
theory, it applies to all citizens, but it was written with Middle Eastern people in mind. In
practice, it empowers law enforcement authorities to raid their homes, offices, and mosques in
the name of the War on Terror. 75 LEO’s authorities were given through the USA PATRIOT Act.
14 years later, some authorities were deemed unfit for current counterterrorism efforts and were
revised in the Freedom Act. 76
President Barack H. Obama signed The Freedom Act on June 2, 2015, a day after the
USA PATRIOT Act expired. The act extended many parts of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
but revised what civil liberties are protected, improved transparency and better information
sharing with the American people, and strengthened national security in the USA PATRIOT
Act. 77
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The revision included provisions to end bulk collection of private information, prevent
government overreach, and allow challenges to national security gag orders. The end to bulk
collection of private information was catalyzed by the ruling of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals on May 7, 2015. The court ruled that bulk collection of photo data is not authorized by
federal law and is illegal. 78 The act improves transparency and better information sharing with
the American people through expert guidance at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) court, declassification of FISA court opinions, and robust government and company
reporting. FISA provides the government with the tools needed to strengthen national security.
These tools include an increase of the statutory maximum prison sentence to 20 years, protection
of the U.S.’s maritime activities from nuclear threats and other threats, enhancement of
investigations of the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the provision
of strictly limited emergency authorities.
United States Supreme Court Cases
U.S. federal and state Supreme Courts have allowed for interrogation and frisks without
probable cause for an arrest providing that there is a reasonable basis for stop and frisks. 79
However, generally, the Supreme Courts have disallowed or limited the use of racial profiling.
The reason is the lack of evidence of a reliable predictive value based on race when weighed
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against the substantial intrusion upon civil liberties embodied by these types of policing
measures. 80
In Terry v. Ohio, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton were frisked by a 39-year police
officer because their activity in front of a jewelry store was suspicious. 81 The officer found a gun
in Terry’s and Chilton’s pockets. 82 They were found guilty because of the suspicious nature of
their behavior and the officer’s concern for his safety. Thereby, making the stop and frisk
permissible. 83 They appealed, but the Appellate court affirmed. 84 Then, Terry appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court and they affirmed the ruling of the lower court. 85 Terry v. Ohio expands the
authority of officers to investigate crimes, including the use of racial profiling, where there is a
reasonable basis for suspicion.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the plaintiff and others were stopped on a major
highway near the Mexican border at a routine, fixed, checkpoint for brief questioning about the
occupants in the vehicle. 86 The issue, in this case, was whether national security stops violate the
Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures? 87 The majority
80
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concluded no. As long as there is reasonable suspicion an individual can be searched in the
interest of public safety. In the majority opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. writes: “The
defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure... But the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.” 88 The race of
Martinez-Fuerte and the other individuals in the car, along with the location they came from,
provided the reasonable suspicion required to be searched since it served the interest of keeping
public safety. This Supreme Court case suggests, under the Fourth Amendment, it is
constitutional to use race as one factor among several for a decision to stop a person, but not as
the sole basis for such a decision.
In Mustafa v. City of Chicago, Anna Mustafa sued police officers for false arrest and
violation of her civil rights following an incident at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport. 89 Mustafa was a
56-year-old woman and an American citizen of Palestinian descent and Muslim faith. 90 Three
months following 9/11, Mustafa along with 19 of her immediate family members purchased
tickets to fly to Europe to attend her father’s funeral. 91 They also ordered “Muslim” meals. 92
Following, Mustafa was escorted to a bomb-detection machine to check her two pieces of
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luggage, but officers failed to check her purse. 93 When she realized it she said, “You already
checked my luggage. Maybe I have a bomb in my purse. Nobody checked that.” 94 Minutes later
officers came to arrest Mustafa and she missed her father’s funeral. 95 She was charged and later
acquitted of a Felony - Disorderly Conduct-Bomb Threat pursuant to 720 Ill. Comp. Stat., 5/261(a)(3). 96 However, her claim of false arrest and violations of civil rights was denied because
there was probable cause to arrest her. 97 The two facts that led a reasonable person to believe a
crime had been committed are (1) commotion and agitation with Mustafa at its center in an
international airport and (2) Mustafa saying, “Maybe I have a bomb.” 98 Regardless of the ruling,
Mustafa was found not a risk. Therefore, racial profiling did not predict or prevent a terrorist
attack.
Two Supreme Court cases that stand out from the previous cases are United States v.
Montero-Camargo and United States v. Avery. In United States v. Montero-Camargo, the court
held that race may not be included in a profile used as a basis for individualized suspicion under
the Fourth Amendment. 99 In United States v. Avery, the court stated that the Equal Protection
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all government actions. 100 These actions include
early stages of police investigations, such as non-coercive questioning, surveillance in public
areas, and requesting consent to conduct searches that are not governed by the Fourth
Amendment because they do not involve actual searches and seizures. Therefore, racial profiling
may be challenged under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 101 Under
general Equal Protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States
Constitution, it may be that racial profiling is generally prohibited in the absence of finding that
its implication is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 102 An acceptable use of
racial profiling can also be defined in how many innocent people are affected and treated. When
stops and searches are truly narrowly tailored, then it makes sense to stop someone who is in the
vicinity at the time a particular crime is committed or if evidence can place the person within a
time frame.
Much of the federal legislation immigrants, non-immigrant aliens, and travelers are
subjected to, are designed to proactively prevent terrorism and provides evidence on a federal
level that racial profiling is not encouraged. However, there are circumstances when the Supreme
Court will allow it. The responsibility falls on each law enforcement agency who interpret
policies and laws based upon their inherent bias, which will be discussed in the solutions section
of this thesis.

100

United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1871).

101

State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).

102

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989).

26

EFFECTIVENESS
The trend of racial profiling has continued from WWII into the War on Terror. The
counterterrorism actions executed have acted as deterrents, not preventions, of some terrorist
attacks. While deterrents and disruptions are helpful, the ultimate goal is to prevent terrorism.
However, current counterterrorism operations are not as effective as they set out to be. As a
result, terrorists continue to recruit, and acts of terrorism continue to occur worldwide.
The process to determine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts is complex but not
impossible. Goals of each agency, as well as goals within a mission, are different, which means
the degrees of effectiveness are constantly changing. As a result, different uses of profiling are
not easily transferable from one agency to another. The definition and standard of effectiveness
should be uniform so that all LEOs can use it in their daily operations. Effectiveness can be
defined in many ways. Arguably, effectiveness in the terms of counterterrorism can be the degree
of success in the prevention of harm through deterrence or incapacitation. 103
Using race to find a criminal can be effective in two ways:
(1) If reliable witnesses report that they saw a white man
running from the scene of a murder and going into a bar in which
there are only three white men, the police have enough information
to detain all three-“reasonable suspicion”-and they might have
probable cause to arrest them as well. If there is only one white
man in the bar, there might just be enough to convict by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 104
(2) While a suspect's race alone is never proof of guilt, a
suspect's race is frequently powerful evidence of innocence. If the
eyewitnesses to a murder are right and the killer was a white man
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that is conclusive evidence of the innocence of any person who is
black, or a woman. (The witnesses could in theory be mistaken, but
even so the police are justified in treating their description as very
strong evidence of innocence of any person of the wrong race or
sex.) 105 This may be the real reason why courts uniformly agree
that police officers may rely on racially specific descriptions of
criminal suspects, despite the prohibition against the use of racial
classification. 106
While this explanation provides effective uses of racial profiling, the effectiveness of
racial profiling is further complicated. The complication arises because the civil rights of
individuals are being compromised when entire classes of people are broadly and vaguely
defined as Middle Eastern in appearance. This definition encompasses not only those of Middle
Eastern descent, but also South Asians, Mediterranean peoples, Hispanic-Americans, AfricanAmericans, and generally “brown” people. 107 The threat against the U.S. is broad and not from a
narrow racial group, but an extreme subset of one of the major religions in the world. 108 The
current criteria fails to separate Muslim extremists from other identifiers by including nonMiddle Eastern, non-Arab, non-extremist people and a vast majority of peaceful and law-abiding
Middle Eastern Muslims. 109 Decisions on whether profiling is appropriate or not are clearly
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arbitrary, which undermines citizens who are Middle Eastern in appearance and their ability to
be secure in the protections provided by the U.S. justice system. 110
Terrorist Diversity
A key sign of the ineffectiveness of current counterterrorism operations is the expansion
of terrorist recruitment to include many different races, ethnicities, and religions. Society has
also become aware of the terrorists’ motives, actions, and variety.

Recently, a group of

protestors took over a building in a federal wildlife refuge in Oregon. 111 There has not been an
official consensus of labeling those actions as terrorist activity; however, it is arguable that if the
group, was made up of Muslims and/or of people who look Middle Eastern, the event would
have been labeled a terrorist attack and ended swiftly by guns and/or raid of the building. 112
The group who occupied the Oregon federal wildlife refuge building were armed, antigovernment extremists. They announced that they were willing to kill or be killed. 113 LEOs did
not have a massive reaction. Also, the media did not provide a minute by minute coverage
detailing the political, religious, and overall personal backgrounds of the terrorists. The LEOs’
response was that it was a protest by “militia members” not terrorists and that they were looking
for a peaceful end. However, the FBI defines domestic terrorism as activities that:
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…involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal
or state law; appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 114
The actions by the “militia members” fall under section (ii) of this definition of domestic
terrorism. Yet, since they did not fit the Middle Eastern racial profile, they were not treated as
though they participated in any of the actions stated in the definition of domestic terrorism.
The Oregon terrorists were not the only ones who did not fit the stereotypical mold of
terrorists. Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to board a plane with explosives in
his shoes, had a British mother and a Jamaican father. 115 Timothy McVeigh was a white,
American militia terrorist who bombed the Oklahoma City Federal building. John Walker Lindh,
the American-born Taliban soldier raised in Marin County, California, was convicted based on
his activities with Al Qaeda. 116 Aafia Siddiqui, a mother of three with a degree from MIT, was
on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list until her capture in 2008. 117 In 2009, a black Nigerian man
named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was arrested for attempting to blow up a Detroit-bound
transatlantic airliner. 118 Colleen LaRose, a white, blonde American woman nicknamed Jihad
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Jane, was arrested for her involvement in a terrorist assassination plan. 119 Also, many local
domestic terrorists were white males whose combined terroristic acts resulted in hundreds of
deaths. They include the Atlanta Centennial Olympic bomber and the Unabomber. 120 The
stereotyping and profiling of those who are or appear to be Middle Eastern as a terrorist can no
longer be the main indicator of a terrorist.
Some terrorist organizations have become diverse and recruit members from all over the
world in multiple demographic groups, which does not align completely with the law
enforcement strategy profile. Even though there is a history of terrorists in the U.S. not being
Middle Eastern, many LEOs still racial profile those who are Middle Eastern as terrorists. Many
terrorists were not caught before their attacks because they did not match the “terrorist profile”
even though their actions leading up to the attacks were reflective of typical terrorist activities. 121
Consistency
Consistency in counterterrorism operations can help accomplish counterterrorism goals
more effectively and efficiently without using racial profiling. In WWII, the War on Drugs, and
the War on Terror, LEOs have been criticized for not being consistent about who they stop,
search, and detain. The Oregon terrorist attack that occurred in January of 2016 is an example of
this premise. In this situation, the typical counterterrorism response used when an individual is
suspected of domestic terrorism was not employed. Consistency also encompasses how close
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local law enforcement agencies are following national counterterrorism laws. Unfortunately,
organizations that use racial profiling as a primary reason to stop, search, seize, and detain do not
keep records on how consistently useful racial profiling has been over the years.
However, recently TSA has shown they have developed consistent security measures,
regardless of the demographic of the individual being searched. For example, a 10-year-old girl
was patted down extensively for having a juice box larger than the three ounces allowed on an
aircraft. 122 She and her father made a public statement on the news about how invading and
humiliating the process was, and there was a public outrage over the incident. Society must come
to understand that what happened to the 10-year-old girl happens to countless people who are
profiled daily.
Even though TSA has become more thorough in their secondary searches, there is a gap
in their counterterrorism operations. The TSA Pre-check is a gap. It assumes a particular person
is a low-risk threat to national security and public safety. The program only considers those who
may qualify as low-risk to receive expedited screening. On their website, they clearly list the
advantages of participating in this program: you do not need to remove your shoes, laptops, 3-11 liquids, belts, or light jackets. 123 The 3-1-1 rule applies to aerosols, gels, and liquids to be in
containers no larger than three ounces. All three-ounce containers must be in one clear plastic resealable bag and each passenger is allowed one. These advantages are ideal for those who fit the
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low-risk profile, but are a disadvantage for all other airport travelers because these types of
people could very well perform acts of terrorism. Yet, because they do not fit the Middle Eastern
profile or are frequent business traveler they are overlooked.
Through the TSA Pre-check, children 12 and under are allowed to travel with an eligible
parent or guardian. This provides the opportunity for the eligible person to use children as a
terrorist weapon or place terrorist weapons in the travel bags of children. The assumptions made
by these types of programs do not allow for fully effective counterterrorism efforts. 124
Many Americans were frightened because the terrorists on 9/11 were Middle Easterners,
which in the U.S. is a minority group. 125 Therefore, racial profiling as part of investigating
terrorism has been largely tolerated. Typically, racially motivated security measures are accepted
along with aggressive measures when they target small and disempowered groups such as racial
minorities and foreigners. 126 Consistency in counterterrorism operations is not accepted as much
as racial profiling. If consistent measures were applied to all people regardless of races,
ethnicities, etc. then, terrorism can be prevented, and there would be more public engagement in
counterterrorism measures.
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SOLUTIONS
Racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts has been ineffective in preventing terrorism.
Terrorists have made it difficult to quantify the value of a life compared to the varying degrees of
harm associated with the improper use of race in counterterrorism efforts. 127 This is especially
true when the perpetrators devalue their lives and the lives of others. 128 There is a need for
reformation of training and policies that govern the actions of LEOs. LEOs should be trained to
use facts instead of implicit biases to help counterterrorism efforts. Along with training, policies
should be enacted to reinforce objectivity instead of subjectivity. It is inevitable that any type of
screening process might be viewed as profiling. However, if we allow race to be a lesser of many
criteria or requirements, it will mitigate its effect on people.
The tools we already have can prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. The laws,
regulations, body scanners, x-rays, and LEOs have been effective so far in deterring terrorist
activity. 129 However, the current system is not perfect and a failure of it can cost many lives.
Therefore, exploring options to make it better is worth it.
Training
When dealing with people, it is important to recognize that although people are a nation’s
greatest asset, there must be an effort to decrease human error. The best possible way to improve
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the human aspect of counterterrorism efforts is by removing inherent biases people have and
implementing policies that do not support the use of inherent biases. 130
There is not a single or fool-proof way to solving this issue. However, a step in the right
direction requires, at minimum, a full day of training given to all LEOs to help them objectively
perform their jobs/careers. 131 The day should consist of helping participants recognize their
biases through tests and conducting procedures in small groups. Finally, each participant should
have the opportunity to create a presentation reflecting on their biases and where the logic for
their biases originated.
Biases develop at a young age, are reinforced as we grow up, and are perpetuated through
experiences, conformity, and the media. 132 When biases are learned, people are resistant to
change even when the evidence does not support them; they embrace and isolate evidence that
supports their biases. 133 Media and television consistently use biases to convey moods, scenes,
and characters. 134 There is mental residue, hidden negative biases, even if someone is working to
behave without them. 135 Since biases are an innate human trait used for survival to determine
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friend or foe, it is reasonable to see why the categorization of people happens so easily. 136 The
schema is a stereotype, which turns into prejudice and then into discrimination. 137
Requiring individuals who will be LEOs to take tests such as Harvard University’s, the
University of Virginia’s, and University of Washington’s Implicit Association Tests (IAT) will
help individuals to first recognize they have an implicit or hidden bias. 138 The tests consist of
categories to choose from including Race (black-white), Arab/Muslims, Gender, and many more
to measure unconscious biases. It allows the test taker to experience their hidden biases as the
test is conducted. One’s reaction time to a set of people and characteristics will bring
unconscious biases into one’s consciousness.
To demonstrate the way the IAT works, we will use the Arab-Muslim IAT category. The
task of the participant is to associate good words (peace, happy, glorious, etc.) and bad words
(nasty, evil, hurt, etc.) with both Arab-Muslims and Other People of nationalities or religion. The
association the participant responds more quickly with, such as Arab-Muslim with bad words
and Other People with good words, shows bias. The reaction is measured in milliseconds, and
when the participant completes the task they receive a rating of “strong”, “moderate”, or “slight”.
There are critics of the IAT test, such as Texas A&M University psychologist Hart Blanton,
Ph.D. Blanton highlights a weakness, the way the test is scored. 139 The IAT provides feedback
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with a failing psychometric, which Blanton believes is an arbitrary metric. 140 However, the IAT
test has been validated by research. 141 From the years of research, general findings indicate (1)
implicit biases are persuasive, (2) most people are often unaware of them, (3) implicit biases
predict behavior, and (4) people differ in levels of implicit bias. 142
The next step would be to break the training participants into small groups to discuss and
perform scenarios. The scenarios could consist of one individual who is required to stop, search,
and detain three to five life-size cutouts of people. The cutouts vary in sex, race, and outward
religious attire. Each scenario is filmed and feedback is provided. Feedback questions would
include: How well did you think you conducted the search? Were you aware of the changes in
your facial expressions, the search techniques you used, and how closely you searched the
person? How did performing this search make you feel? Where did your biases come from? How
did they influence your action? What can we do about them? The first person to give feedback
will be the individual who performed the procedures. The next would be from their peers. The
last would be from their small group supervisor. Afterwards, participants would re-watch the
scenario through film to discuss and determine the extent to which feedback corresponded
appropriately with actions taken.
140

Id.

141

John Tierney, In Bias Test, Shades of Gray, NEW YORK TIMES, (Nov. 18, 2008); Hal R. Arkes and Philip E.
Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or ‘Would Jesse Jackson “Fail” the Implicit Association
Test?, PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY, 15, no. 4, 257–278, (2008)
http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/IATmaterials/PDFs/AT.psychinquiry.2004.pdf; Anthony G. Greenwald, et al.,
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, JOURNAL OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 97, no. 1, 17-41, (2009),
http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/GPU&B.meta-analysis.JPSP.2009.pdf; Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang, and
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 (Dec. 2007).
142

Id.

37

Once participants have completed these steps, they would create a final presentation to
present to their classmates. It will be a reflection on what they learned about their types of biases,
the history of where they may have begun and been reinforced, the results of the small group
scenarios, and the steps they can take to mitigate or eliminate their implicit bias.
The goal of these activities is to help participants become more aware of what their
implicit biases are and how they can fix it to be better LEOs and overall better people. When
people become aware of their hidden biases, if they desire, they can monitor their behavior and
play close attention to verbal language, body language, and stigmatizations of target groups. 143 A
conscious decision to change can lead someone to reduce their unconscious biases. 144
Policy
To mitigate the improper use of race in counterterrorism operations, policies should be
created, enacted, and enforced to be a reference for authorities to use and help to clarify how to
appropriately adhere to policies. Policies should explain what LEOs are doing, why they are
doing it, and how it helps to achieve the agency’s overall mission. In Dr. Fridell’s book, Racially
Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to Implicit Black-Crime Association, she
present ideal policies to be created to ensure certain criteria are met in order to stop, search,
seize, interdict, or detain based upon race. 145 She presents three policy models:
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(1) The race or ethnicity of an individual shall not be the
sole factor in determining the existence of probable cause to place
in custody or arrest an individual or in constituting a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that an offense has been or is being
committed so as to justify the detention of an individual or the
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. 146
(2) Officers may not consider the race or ethnicity of a
person in the course of any law enforcement action unless the
officer is seeking to detain, apprehend, or otherwise be on the
lookout for a specific suspect sought in connection with a specific
crime who has been identified or described in part by race or
ethnicity. 147
(3) Officers shall not consider race/ethnicity to establish
reasonable suspicion or probable cause except that officers may
take into account the reported race/ethnicity of a potential
suspect(s) based on trustworthy, locally relevant information that
links a person or persons of a specific race/ethnicity to a particular
unlawful incident(s). 148
The first policy is a Connecticut statute on racial profiling and it reflects the “solely
model”. This policy provides a loophole because if a LEO were to stop a Middle Eastern man for
having a liquid over the allowed amount at an airport, but leaves a white man alone for the same
issue, it is not violating a “solely model” policy. The decision was based on race and another
factor (race and violation of airport liquid policy). The second and third policies mandate a LEO
to show the link between identifiers, such as race, and the certain suspect who was stopped,
searched, detained, and arrested. For example, if an eyewitness describes the terrorist suspect by
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race, physical description, and clothing then, race, along with the other identifiers, can be used as
a means to stop, search, detain, and arrest.
Another suggested policy would be that LEOs may wear body cameras with vocal
recordings at all times during their shift. This would not only monitor inherent biases, but it
would also show questionable force used absent of imminent danger. In airports across the
country, TSA officers screen passengers through X-rays and bag checks. One person is in a room
only looking at the screen and tells the front line people when they need to check a person or
bag. Unfortunately, the thoroughness of the search is not 100% certain because the front line
person is performing a secondary search on different categories of people. Training on how all
secondary searches should be conducted can help ensure each officer is performing the same
secondary search on every “flagged” individual regardless of race, gender, age, etc. Camera
recordings can provide evidence that searches are happening the way they should.
With monitoring, there must be a level of autonomy with LEOs. Camera or video footage
should only be used when the person monitoring believes there is a consistent use of biases by
the LEO conducting stops and searches and/or when someone complains about being racially
profiled while a stop and/or search was conducted on them. Accountability within each LEO
must be established through the organizational culture. The culture may be, to be honest, truthful,
and loyal to the position, the organization, and its mission.
In addition, if a LEO has profiled and there is a correlation between the profiling and the
implicit bias test results then, they enter a graduated consequence system. The system would be
tailored to each organization’s capabilities. However, here is an example of what it may look
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like. The first instance, the LEO is given a verbal warning and must go through immediate
retraining. The second instance, they are given a written warning and probation from that
particular job in the company. They will receive a night shift job that does not require them to
work on the front lines, so they may still earn their pay. The third instance, they are suspended
without pay for three days. The consequences are worsened by how many times the offense is
made. In contrast to the graduated consequence system, LEOs, who consistently perform their
job objectively with little to no implicit biases, will enter a graduated reward system. This system
would be tailored to each organization’s capabilities as well. Each month the LEO performs well
he/she will receive recognition on the organization’s monthly award board. When he/she has
consistently performed for three months, in addition to the board recognition, he/she will receive
a $50 restaurant gift card. At six months, he/she will receive a $100 Visa gift card. The incentive
will start over each year, but as long as he/she is performing consistently the incentives will be
provided. Even if the organizations cannot offer financial incentives, they should still offer
something that motivates their members. This may motivate people to adhere to policies since it
can affect their livelihood.
Policy making requires research and time. However, there are important questions to
answer when writing and enacting policy that can help prevent racial profiling in U.S.
Counterterrorism. Thereby, making it more effective. Was race or other discriminatory factors
the motive to stop, search, and detain someone? Was that suspect treated with respect throughout
the entire process? Is the manner designed to discover relevant information that is freely given?
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LIMITATIONS
Limitations of this thesis include: racial profiling provides deterrence, the attackers of
9/11 were Middle Easterners, and a survey with analyzed data could have been conducted
specifically for this thesis. Although racial profiling is inadequate in preventing terrorism, it
provides deterrence. 149 However, if the ultimate goal is to prevent terrorism and terrorist are only
deterred, research must be done to find more effective and progressive ways to combat and
prevent terrorism.
Also, the attackers of 9/11 were Middle Easterners and following the attacks racial
profiling was justified. On July 31st, 2012, the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC)
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, stated Sunni Extremists were responsible for the greatest
amount of worldwide terrorist attacks and fatalities for the third consecutive year in a row. 150
Sunni Extremists committed about 56% of all attacks and about 70% of all fatalities, globally. 151
Sunni is a branch of the Muslim religion and 85%-90% of the world’s Muslim population is
Sunnis. 152 Most Sunnis live in the Middle East and makeup of 90% or more of Egypt’s, Jordan’s,
and Saudi Arabia’s populations. 153 In the NCTC’s most recent report in 2014, they list five
organizations as the top perpetrators of worldwide terrorist attacks who have ties to Middle
149
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Eastern nations: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko
Haram, and Maoists/Communist Party of India-Maoist. 154 However, there is a lack of available,
current, and reliable statistical information to determine if in the last few years racial profiling is
adequate in preventing terrorism in the U.S.
In addition, a survey and analyzing of data specifically for the purpose of this thesis was
not conducted. Ideally, a survey would be sent out to organizations such as the TSA and DHS
asking if they racial profile in their counterterrorism operations. The follow-up question would
be: how effective it has been along with statistical data on the race of terrorist they deterred or
captured? The survey would provide evidence that racial profiling is either adequate or not based
upon quantifiable and qualifiable evidence.
Many people profile, it is apparent. Even children profile unfamiliar adults as dangerous
strangers and are taught to know the difference. These limitations make racial profiling
compelling but it is ineffective and the law does not support it. It is not accepted unless there is
probable cause or another justified reasoning. 155
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CONCLUSION
There is not a clear-cut answer to the improper use of race within U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. A clear, quantifiable answer may not be feasible when there is ample room for the
subjective weighing of many outcomes to racial profiling. 156 Critics of racial profiling argue that
profiling violates fundamental civil rights. 157 While advocates of racial profiling contend that
those rights must bend concerning public safety and the prevention of a catastrophic loss of
lives. 158 The costs and benefits need to be balanced. Informed decisions can be made when
provided with the proper training. While U.S. counterterrorism can be modified to be less
intrusive, they provide deterrents, and it would be foolish to eliminate those provisions
completely.
Steps have been made in the right direction where screening processes, such as TSA’s
Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), have been expanded by
incorporating more nonracial factors, so race is only one measure and not the main factor. 159
Race, together with other information about the suspect, can form a pattern that is persuasive to
any degree. 160 Race should be one of many investigative factors, not a determinative one, to aid
in counterterrorism efforts. Other informative measures that have been added are travel patterns,
156
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professional or familial connections, criminal records, financial history, and affiliations with
other groups and individuals. 161 This allows LEOs to make the most informed decisions through
holistic information about an individual.
It is achievable to determine if LEOs are using racial profiling to operate on a general
assumption that Middle Eastern people, especially men, commit acts of terror, or if they are
pursuing specific information about the 9/11 attacks to prevent terrorist attacks. Also, when
LEOs are combating terrorism they may not know how to separate or distinguish the two
conditions. Redefining the group of people who are deemed more likely to be a terrorist, through
actions, not race, and creating the balance between security and civil rights will ensure the
overall integrity of the system for all parties involved. Inevitably, there will be individual cases
where racial profiling issues will come into play. However, the system must work in favor of the
group so individual cases are less likely. 162
Society and law enforcement, including the DHS, respond to each other in a variety of
ways. The reoccurring trend is if society requests stronger national security measures then, law
enforcement responds with strengthened security measures. However, many times, this means
racial profiling is used in order to aid in combating crimes. The effectiveness of profiling has yet
to be scientifically proven, although surveys and hypothetical equations to calculate the
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effectiveness have been conducted. 163 The results did not validate or invalidate racial profiling as
effective. 164
Attitudes regarding racial profiling in the name of preventing terrorism are contingent on
one’s mission, training, and work environment. LEOs have a duty to maintain security, prevent
crime, enforce the law, and conduct counterterrorism operations. They are responsible if they fail
to do any of these. General society does not have these responsibilities. Consequently, LEOs
would more likely see some value in being able to recognize suspicious terrorist behavior
coupled with a more probable physical description in a security-sensitive situation.
Training individuals to recognize and eliminate personal biases will be a key aspect of
solving racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts. Testing, active participation in scenarios, and
retention of policies that prohibit racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts will aid in the
solution. The issue of racial profiling is generational and contingent upon the tragedies that
catalyze LEOs to perform the duties they swore to do.
Since 9/11, the fear of future terrorist attacks heightened investigation because of the
seriousness of the threat. With that and the identity of the terrorists, the government was justified
in its initial investigations focused on Middle Eastern men; although it provided anxiety and pain
to those who fit the profile. However, 15 years later, it is no longer justified with the changes to
who the terrorists recruit, what they believe, and their capabilities. The individuals impacted by
9/11 or raised with the stigmatizing of Middle Eastern people have been subjected to the biases
163
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of who commit terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, this is a harder change to make, but it is
achievable through retroactive training.
The government must now operate with appropriate reasoning and adequate information.
Racial profiling is no less complicated or troubling. Therefore, we must have a deep suspicion of
it. The consequences of negative stereotypes are discrimination, stigmatization, and the
overlooking of other groups. This can cause investigators to more likely suspect criminal
behavior in targeted groups. It is dangerous for LEOs to investigate in this way because it
deprives the rights of and degrades the targeted group. It also affects split-second, life or death
decisions. The starting point to prevent the improper use of race is the presumption that no one
racial group should be considered more suspicious or dangerous than another. More research
should be conducted to provide a new alternative to the issue of racial profiling in national
security efforts. Profiling can be based upon other information, such as behavior and childhood
experiences instead of race because they provide more evidence of who is likely to commit a
crime. 165
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